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In two retroactive interference experiments, we assessed the eþ ect of mentally imagined movement speed on
subsequent motor performance. All participants performed a sequential motor action at three speeds during
a baseline test and a retention test. During the retention interval of Experiment 1, the participants (n = 50)
physically performed the action at a slow speed, physically performed it at a fast speed, imagined it at a slow
speed, imagined it at a fast speed, or performed a no-practice control task. In Experiment 2, the participants
(n = 24) imagined the movement, overtly vocalized words, or both, all at a slow speed. The results revealed that
the speed of the imagined motor action aþ ected the speed of subsequent performance in the retention test
and that imagery and physical practice were functionally equivalent. The results are consistent with Lang’ s
bio-informational theory.
Keywords: bio-informational theory, imagery, retroactive interference, speed, sport psychology.
Introduction
In sport psychology, it is generally recommended to
apply imagery in real time, at the speed at which athletes
actually perform the actions (Nideþ er, 1985; Weinberg
and Gould, 1995; Gould and Damarjian, 1996). How-
ever, the theoretical foundation and the empirical
evidence that substantiates this advice are limited, and
it is not unusual in sports to imagine a skill in slow
motion. For instance, Tomas Gustafson, a Swedish
speed skater, used to imagine his movement patterns
at slow speed outside the skating-rink (Hermansson,
1989). Here, we examine possible interfering eþ ects
of imagined movement speeds on subsequent move-
ment performance and provide an explanation based
on Lang’ s (1977, 1979, 1984, 1987) bio-informational
theory of emotional imagery. Bio-informational theory
oþ ers an elaborate explanation of the processes involved
in imagery (see Hecker and Kaczor, 1988; Bakker et al.,
1996) and appears to be particularly suitable for
explaining interference eþ ects on motor actions. Even
though Lang’ s theory does not speci® cally address the
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topic of interference of motor imagery, the theory does
permit predictions about it.
According to bio-informational theory, each image
structure contains three fundamental classes of coded
information (Lang, 1984, 1987; Cuthbert and Lang,
1989; Hale, 1994; Drobes and Lang, 1995): stimulus
propositions, response propositions and meaning
propositions. Stimulus propositions refer to the scenario
or event to be imagined and describe the objective
properties of a speci® c stimulus feature (i.e. the stimulus
context). Response propositions contain modality-speci® c
assertions about behaviour, such as verbal responses,
motor actions or visceral responses. Response proposi-
tions are of particular importance because they are
double-coded; beyond the associational or propositional
networks, the deep structure of such propositions is
linked to the motor command system that generates
eþ erent output. Because of this link between response
propositions and motor programmes, imagery normally
involves eþ erent leakage, which might be assessed
by EMG recordings (see Bakker et al., 1996). Meaning
propositions are associative properties that elaborate
upon the signi® cance of stimulus and response infor-
mation. These properties play an analytical and inter-
pretative role by de® ning the meaning of input and
output events, the probability of stimulus occurrence
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and the consequences of an action. Meaning propo-
sitions represent information that is not objectively
present in the stimulus context. These three proposi-
tional constructs are the basic units of a preparatory
set to respond; that is, they form an information net-
work that constitutes a prototype for overt behaviour
(a response prototype). Such a propositional network
can be reactivated and processed by using a set of three
primary imagery instruction elements (Lang et al.,
1980, p. 180): `1) an image cue, the simple instruction to
generate an image; 2) the image orthesis, a more or less
elaborate description of the things to be imagined; and
3) instructions to take an action set, that is, to imagine
oneself as personally engaged in the image context,
ª as if º  it were really happening’ . For the application
of imagery, this means that, to enhance the eý cacy
of imagery, the image cue, orthesis and action set pro-
vided to an athlete should include not only stimulus
propositions but response and meaning propositions as
well. In addition, Hecker and Kaczor (1988) reported
that processing occurs only when a critical number of
propositions are accessed, indicating that imagery will
only result in a behavioural change when the image is
vivid.
The aim of the present study was to assess the eþ ect
of the speed of an imagined movement. If move-
ment speed can be regarded as a signi® cant feature
of actions, it will be represented in some way within
the informational network. When movement speed is
propositionally encoded, imagery can and will modify
the temporal aspects of this informational network.
This implies that the network can be modi® ed in two
directions ±  its propositions can re¯ ect the motor action
at a faster or a slower speed, depending on the imagined
movement speed. Imagery of a motor action at a speci® c
speed will result in speed-speci® c interference to a
subsequently performed motor action.
The speed at which a movement or a series of move-
ments is performed is important. Movement speed
sometimes distinguishes between actions of the same
class and can be considered a demarcation criterion
for motor actions. For example, moving your feet at a
low or high speed towards an incoming ball will result
in stopping or kicking the ball, respectively. Move-
ment speed should therefore be regarded as a distinct
and relevant feature of action that is encoded within
a propositional network. Indeed, Sirigu et al. (1996)
demonstrated excellent congruence between maximum
imagined and executed movement speed, indicating
that normal individuals are able to imagine a motor
action quite accurately at a speci® c speed. The speed of
an imagined action might be encoded in the response,
meaning or stimulus propositions of the preparatory set,
which will function as a speed-speci® c response proto-
type for overt behaviour.
We report two experiments that used a retroactive
interference paradigm. Several researchers have shown
interference eþ ects of interpolated physical activity
on performance of a criterion motor task (see Magill,
1989; Schmidt and Lee, 1999). There is evidence to
suggest that recall of the criterion task shifts in the direc-
tion of the interpolated activity (Craft and Hinrichs,
1971; Stelmach and Walsh, 1972). When, for instance,
the interpolated activity is a movement of greater
amplitude than the criterion movement, then the ampli-
tude of the criterion movement at the retention test
will tend to increase, whereas an interpolated movement
of smaller amplitude will tend to cause the amplitude
to decrease during the retention test. This direction-
speci® c biasing eþ ect is known as the `assimilation
tendency’.
Several studies (Johnson, 1982; Gabriele et al., 1989;
Hall et al., 1995) have shown that imagining a motor
performance can also interfere with a subsequently
performed movement. Using a linear positioning task,
Johnson (1982) showed that interpolated imagery
resulted in an assimilation tendency for movement
amplitude (or movement length), suggesting a func-
tional equivalence between imagery and physical
practice. Gabriele et al. (1989) showed that this
similarity also holds for contextual interference. Hall
et al. (1995) provided further evidence for the func-
tional similarity of imagery and physical practice
using retroactive interference. These authors showed
that the amount of imagery or physical practice during
the retention interval aþ ected the magnitude of the
interference eþ ect. However, all of their groups,
including the imagery groups and the rest group,
received interpolated physical practice trials as well.
Therefore, any interference eþ ects found for the
imagery groups might be the result of the received
interpolated physical practice. They found that more
interpolated imagery or physical practice caused
poorer movement pattern retention (there was a larger
interference eþ ect) than less interpolated practice.
Additionally, imaging a faster performance during the
retention interval resulted in a faster subsequent per-
formance. This ® nding suggests that, for the temporal
aspects of a movement, there is a similarity between
interpolated imagery and physical practice, although
the results do not permit conclusions to be drawn
regarding possible interference eþ ects of imagined
movement speed.
To date, the tasks used to investigate interference of
motor imagery have been elementary motor tasks,
typical in a laboratory setting, but they do not resemble
the complexity of common actions in sport. In the
present study, interference eþ ects were investigated
using a more complex motor task, corresponding, for
instance, to sequential motor actions of a gymnastic
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¯ oor exercise, the learning of a feint in soccer or basket-
ball, the ® xed step pattern of a high-jumper in track and
® eld events, or a step sequence in a salsa, a foxtrot or a
waltz.
In summary, if a motor action is imagined, this might
modify the propositional network. The modi® ed net-
work or prototype for overt behaviour will re¯ ect
the characteristics of the imagined motor action. For
instance, when during imagery the movement ampli-
tude or length (see Johnson, 1982) or movement pattern
(see Gabriele et al., 1989; Hall et al., 1995) is diþ erent
from the preceding performance, then the propositions
in the information network will change accordingly.
Such a modi® ed network is assumed to alter subsequent
performance.
Experiment 1
Based on Lang’ s theory we assumed that: (1) an
imagined variant on an action will interfere with the
subsequent execution of that action, and (2) that this
interference will reveal an assimilation eþ ect (i.e. it
will be speed-speci® c). We hypothesized that inter-
polated imagery of a sequential motor action at a fast
speed would lead to faster performance of this move-
ment during a retention test, and that interpolated
imagery of the same task at a slow speed would lead to
slower performance in the retention test. We also pre-
dicted that interpolated imagery would result in inter-
ference eþ ects similar to those of interpolated physical
performance, which would provide further evidence of
functional equivalence between imagery and physical
practice of movement speed.
Methods
Participants
Fifty undergraduate or recently graduated students
(22 males, 28 females) took part in the experiment (age
26.1 ± 4.6 years; mean ± s). All participants were naive
to the aims of the experiment and were paid for their
participation.
Experimental task
Figure 1 is a diagram of the sequential motor action
used in this study. One complete sequential motor action
(one trial) consisted of a sequence of 12 rhythmic steps
performed within a square drawn on the ¯ oor. At the
beginning of the experiment, the sequential motor task
was demonstrated by the experimenter and practised
by the participants for 1 min. After this short practice,
all participants were able to perform the 12 steps of the
motor action in the correct sequence. To account for
individual diþ erences in comfortable stride length, the
sides of the square were adjusted to the participant’ s
leg length (measured from the trochanter major to the
malleolus lateralis). The mean length of the sides of
the square was 0.9 m.
Apparatus and instrumentation
For all participants, EMG signals were recorded from
the tibialis anterior of the right leg using standard dis-
posable Ag/AgCl surface electrodes, applied over the
origo and insertio sides of the muscle, and a reference or
ground electrode attached to the lateral ankle. However,
analysis of the amplitude and frequency of the EMG
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the 12 steps of the sequential motor task. The black footmarks represent the location of the
feet; the dotted footmark represents the initial location of a foot before moving. At the starting position, the participants stood
with both feet in the lower left position. The participants started the sequential motor actions by moving their right foot forward
(1), then their left foot forward (2), then their right foot backward (3), etc. They ended one motor action by moving their right
foot sideways (12). The subsequent sequential motor task (starting with 1 again) was executed directly after the last step (12).
There was no delay between step 12 and step 1 of the subsequent task.
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signals during physical performance did not reveal any
diþ erences among the three walking speeds. That is, the
EMG signals were unable to discriminate among the
three diþ erent movement speeds; therefore, no further
EMG analysis was conducted.
Foot± ¯ oor contact and the movements of the legs of
the participants up to the hip were recorded using a
standard VHS video camera at a sampling rate of 25 Hz.
The camera was located 3.5 m behind the participant
(placed about 0.2 m above the ¯ oor). To assess move-
ment duration, a time-code generated by an Alpermann+
Velte TC 30 Generator was added to the videotapes.
To determine the imagery ability of the groups, the
shortened version of the Dutch Movement Imagery
Questionnaire (see Hall and Pongrac, 1983; Goss et al.,
1986; Schattel, 1992) was used. This version of the
questionnaire consists of six items designed speci® cally
to measure imagery of movements and contains scales
for measuring visual and kinaesthetic imagery ability.
The diý culty participants experienced in imagining
the movements was indicated on a 7-point rating scale,
ranging from 1 (`easy to imagine’ ) to 7 (`diý cult to
imagine’ ; Goss et al., 1986). The reliability of the Dutch
version of the questionnaire is good. Cronbach’ s alpha
internal consistency coeý cients are 0.90 (visual sub-
scale) and 0.91 (kinaesthetic subscale). The test± retest
reliability of the subscales is r = 0.83 and r = 0.75
respectively at an interval of 3 weeks (Schattel, 1992).
Alphas of the shortened versions are 0.88 (visual sub-
scale) and 0.85 (kinaesthetic subscale). Additionally,
information was gathered concerning the participants’
sporting activities and their everyday use of imagery
during the previous year.
Treatment groups
The participants were randomly assigned to one of ® ve
groups that diþ ered in the activity to be performed dur-
ing the retention interval, each of which contained 10
individuals:
1. Physically perform the sequential motor action at a
slow speed (slow physical, PS); 5 males, 5 females.
2. Physically perform the sequential motor action at a
fast speed (fast physical, PF); 3 males, 7 females.
3. Imagine the sequential motor action at a slow speed
(slow imagery, IS); 5 males, 5 females.
4. Imagine the sequential motor action at a fast speed
(fast imagery, IF); 4 males, 6 females.
5. A control group (C) that received an interpolated no-
practice task; 5 males, 5 females.
At the beginning of the experiment, the imagery
groups (IS and IF) received instructions regarding:
(1) what is meant by i`magery’ ; (2) that imagery is an
eþ ective technique for practising motor skills; (3) that
it is applied by many elite athletes; and (4) to create an
impression that is as vivid as possible, one has to use all
one’ s senses (i.e. imagine the visual, auditory, haptic
and kinaesthetic characteristics of the movement).
Procedure
The participants were tested individually in a quiet
room. To prevent any distraction during the experiment,
opaque screens limited the participants’  visual ® eld.
After outlining the experimental design to the partici-
pants, they completed an informed consent form and
answered questions regarding personal characteristics
(i.e. name, age and sex). The procedure of the experi-
ment and the criterion task were explained, although no
information was provided about possible retroactive
interference eþ ects or about the variables to be assessed.
Standardized instructions were provided during the
experiment. The experiment consisted of three phases:
baseline test, retention interval and retention test (see
Table 1).
Baseline test. In the ® rst phase of the experiment,
all participants performed the sequential motor action
at three diþ erent speeds: the preferred speed of the
participant, about two times slower and about two
times faster than their preferred speed. The participants
were instructed not to perform the f`ast speed’  con-
dition at their maximum speed, to prevent a ceiling
eþ ect and to enable a faster performance of the f`ast
speed’  condition during the retention test. The parti-
cipants chose the three speeds themselves, not with the
Table 1. Design of Experiment 1
Groups
Baseline
testa Retention intervalb
Retention
test
PS
PF
IS
IF
C1
C2
P1-F-P2-S
P1-S-P2-F
P1-F-P2-S
P1-S-P2-F
P1-F-P2-S
P1-S-P2-F
Slow physical performance
Fast physical performance
Slow mental imagery
Fast mental imagery
Control task
Control task
P1-F-P2-S
P1-S-P2-F
P1-F-P2-S
P1-S-P2-F
P1-F-P2-S
P1-S-P2-F
a During the baseline test and the retention test, all participants per-
formed the same sequential motor action (see Fig. 1), the same
number of trials (® ve trials for each speed condition) and the same
speed conditions. The speed conditions were presented in two dif-
ferent orders (P1-F-P2-S and P1-S-P2-F): `P’  is the preferred speed
condition, `F’  is the fast speed condition and `S’  is the slow speed
condition.
b During the retention interval (or interpolated practice period),
the participants either performed the sequential motor action at a
slow (PS) or fast (PF) speed, imagined the sequential motor action at
a slow (IS) or fast (IF) speed, or performed a control task (C).
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aid of a metronome. The three speeds were performed
in two diþ erent orders depending on group: preferred1-
fast-preferred 2-slow (P1-F-P2-S) and preferred1-slow-
preferred2-fast (P1-S-P2-F). The groups performing the
interpolated trials at a slow speed (PS and IS) and half
the participants in the control group (C1) received the
`P1-F-P2-S’  order conditions. The groups performing
the interpolated trials at a fast speed (PF and IF) and
the other half of the control group (C2) received the
`P1-S-P2-F’  order of conditions. Consequently, the last
speed condition in the baseline test was the same as the
practice speed in the retention interval (except for the
control group, who received no practice). A trial was
de® ned as one complete sequential motor action of 12
steps. Each speed condition consisted of ® ve success-
fully performed sequential motor actions or trials. When
a participant made a mistake during the execution of
the motor action, he or she immediately repeated the
sequential motor action (resulting in an additional trial),
thereby performing six sequential motor actions instead
of ® ve. More than one mistake was made in less than
5% of the speed conditions.
Retention interval. A fundamental tenet of bio-
informational theory is that the imagery instruction
(orthesis and action set) should be personalized to
optimize the eý cacy of meaning propositions. Smith
et al. (1999) showed that the use of video (® lmed from
the perspective of the participant) is more eþ ective
in enhancing performance than a personalized written
script or audio-tape. Therefore, at the beginning of the
retention interval (the interpolated practice period), the
participants in the two physical and two imagery groups
were shown a video of their last trial during the baseline
test, and were asked to perform (physical groups) or
imagine (imagery groups) the sequential motor action
at the speed they had just observed on the television
screen.
At the beginning of each imagery trial, the partici-
pants in the two imagery groups were asked to close
their eyes and to imagine the sequential motor action
(i.e. the image cue), to imagine the steps of the sequen-
tial motor action at the speed observed in the video
(i.e. the image orthesis), to visualize the movements as
vividly as possible, and to imagine the kinaesthetic and
haptic sensations when covertly performing the steps
of the sequential motor action (i.e. the action set). The
participants in the two imagery groups were instructed
to use imagery in the way that was most comfortable for
them. In addition, they were told that the instructor or
experimenter would tell them when to start and when to
stop the imagery session.
The participants in the two physical and two imagery
groups practised the sequential motor action in ® ve
blocks of ® ve successive trials. Between blocks, the parti-
cipants were allowed a short break of 1± 1.5 min. For
the participants in the imagery groups, the duration
of an imagery practice block (® ve trials) during the
retention interval was the same as the duration of the
last speed condition in the baseline test (slow imagery
group 51.7 ± 16.9 s; fast imagery group 27.8 ± 3.2 s;
mean ± s). The participants in the control group did
not practise the sequential motor action; instead, they
completed a standardized questionnaire.
Retention test. The retention test was identical to the
baseline test for all participants in all groups.
Manipulation check. After completion of the retention
test, a brief post-experimental interview was conducted.
The participants in the imagery groups were asked
if they had imagined the steps of the sequential
motor action and if they had imagined the motor
action at the instructed speed. The participants in
the control group were asked if they had used imagery
during the experiment. Finally, the shortened version
of the Dutch Movement Imagery Questionnaire was
administered.
Assessments
Five successive trials (sequential motor actions) were
performed at each speed, but only the middle three
trials were analysed (starting and ® nishing the motor
action might have altered the duration of the ® rst and
last trials). The speed at which the sequential motor
action was performed was measured as the time
required to complete a sequential motor action ±  that is,
the time to execute one trial. For each speed condition
and participant, the mean time to complete a trial in
the retention test was subtracted from the mean time to
complete a trial in the baseline test, providing the con-
stant error. The constant error represents the amount
of interference produced by the interpolated practice.
Comparison of the mean constant error between the
imagery and physical practice groups reveals the func-
tional similarity (equivalence or dissimilarity) of both
types of practice.
Results
Characteristics of participants
Using three one-way analyses of variance, there were no
signi® cant diþ erences between the ® ve experimental
groups on imagery ability (assessed using the shortened
version of the Dutch Movement Imagery Question-
naire, MIQ) or on familiarity with and the daily use of
imagery. The Dutch MIQ scores (ranging from 1 =
`easy to imagine’  to 7 = `diý cult to imagine’ ) for the ® ve
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experimental groups were: MIQPS 2.6 ± 0.95; MIQPF
2.5 ± 1.14; MIQIS 2.8 ± 1.47; MIQIF 3.0 ± 1.23; MIQC
3.1 ± 0.92 (mean ± s).
Eþ ects of design and conditions
To check for possible eþ ects caused by the two orders of
speed conditions (P1-F-P2-S and P1-S-P2-F), a repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted
on the mean time (T) to perform a trial at baseline,
with order (P1-F-P2-S and P1-F-P2-S) as a between-
individuals factor and speed condition (slow, preferred1,
preferred2 and fast) as a within-individuals factor. This
analysis showed the expected eþ ect for speed condition
(F3,144 = 215.75, P < 0.001, observed power = 1.00).
Order did not result in a signi® cant main eþ ect
(F1,48 = 0.68) and there was no signi® cant interaction.
Post-hoc analysis (LSD test, with a level of signi® cance
of 0.05) revealed a signi® cant diþ erence between the
slow (TS = 10.04 ± 2.50 s), the preferred (TP1 = 7.55 ±
1.48 s, TP2 = 7.45 ± 1.69 s) and fast (TF = 5.53 ± 1.22 s)
speed conditions. The speeds at which the preferred
conditions were performed (P1 and P2) did not diþ er
signi® cantly. Although the participants did not perform
the sequential motor action at a factor of two slower or
faster than their preferred speed, they did perform the
task slower and faster as instructed.
Retention interval and manipulation check
For the participants in the slow physical practice
group, the mean time to complete one sequential
motor action at the slow speed during the retention
interval was 140% of the mean preferred speed
(compared to 129% during baseline performance);
the participants in the fast physical practice group
performed the fast speed at 67% of the mean preferred
speed (compared to 71% during baseline performance).
All participants in the two imagery groups reported
that they imagined the steps of the sequential motor
action at approximately the instructed speed, although
several participants in the fast imagery group reported
that it was diý cult to imagine the action at the fast
speed. None of the participants in the control group
reported that they had used imagery during the
experiment.
Eþ ect of interference
To test the hypothesis that diþ erences in speed during
the retention interval would result in speed-speci® c
interference eþ ects, a repeated-measures ANOVA was
performed on the constant error (revealing the amount
of interference), with group (PS, PF, IS, IF and C) as a
between-individuals factor and speed condition (slow,
preferred1, preferred2 and fast) as a within-individuals
factor. This ANOVA resulted in a signi® cant main eþ ect
of group (F4,45 = 5.01, P = 0.002, observed power =
0.94) and a signi® cant interaction of group and speed
condition (F12,135 = 1.95, P = 0.034, observed power =
0.90). Table 2 shows the mean constant errors by group
and by speed condition; Fig. 2 shows the eþ ect of inter-
ference by group. A positive constant error indicates
that, during the retention test, the sequential motor
action was performed slower than during the baseline
test, whereas a negative constant error indicates that the
movement was performed faster during the retention
test than during the baseline test. Post-hoc analysis (LSD
test, with a level of signi® cance of 0.05) on the main
eþ ect for group revealed that the two slow practising
groups (PS and IS) were signi® cantly diþ erent from the
other three groups. The signi® cant diþ erence between
Table 2. Interference eþ ects (constant error) of Experiment 1a
Speed condition
Groups Slow Preferred1 Preferred2 Fast Mean CE
b
PS
PF
IS
IF
C
951 ± 1940
- 887 ± 874
516 ± 1330
- 757 ± 789
- 578 ± 954
222 ± 1063
- 665 ± 617
598 ± 1321
- 396 ± 557
- 37 ± 530
335 ± 852
- 693 ± 492
457 ± 1108
- 102 ± 548
- 125 ± 469
475 ± 304
- 275 ± 245
462 ± 929
15 ± 463
147 ± 549
496 ± 946
- 630 ± 456
508 ± 1041
- 310 ± 476
- 148 ± 356
Signi® cance
at P < 0.05
PS > PF, IF, C
IS > PF, IF
PS > PF
IS > PF, IF
PS > PF
IS > PF
PS > PF
IS > PF
PS > PF, IF, C
IS > PF, IF, C
a A positive constant error indicates that the sequential motor action is performed more slowly during the retention test
than during the baseline test; a negative constant error indicates the opposite.
b The last column reveals the main eþ ect for group (see also Fig. 2).
Abbreviations: CE = constant error, PS = slow physical, PF = fast physical, IS = slow imagery, IF = fast imagery,
C = control.
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the slow practising groups and the control group indi-
cated the existence of an interference eþ ect. Physically
performing as well as imagining the sequential motor
action at a slow speed resulted in a similar amount of
interference (the size of the interference eþ ect was
similar, as was the standard deviation). The signi® cant
diþ erence between the fast practising participants (PF
and IF) and the slow practising participants (PS and IS)
indicated an assimilation eþ ect. For the fast imagery
and physical practice groups (PF and IF), no interfer-
ence was demonstrated, although for these groups the
mean changes were in the expected direction (a decrease
in the constant error).
A post-hoc analysis (LSD test, with a level of sig-
ni® cance of 0.05) examining the two-way interaction
between group and speed showed that, for all four
speed conditions, there was a signi® cant diþ erence
between both slow practising groups (PS and IS) and
the fast physical group (see Table 2). Furthermore,
for the slow and preferred1 speed conditions, the slow
imagery group was also signi® cantly diþ erent from the
fast imagery group; for the slow speed condition, the
slow physical group also diþ ered from the fast imagery
and control groups. For the fast physical group, there
was also a signi® cant diþ erence between both preferred
speed conditions and the fast speed condition. For the
fast imagery group, the fast speed condition was signi® -
cantly diþ erent from the preferred1 and slow speed
conditions, while the preferred2 speed condition diþ ered
Fig. 2. Results of Experiment 1. Mean constant errors (mCE:
average of the four speed conditions) for the ® ve groups:
physical practice at a slow speed (PS), physical practice at a
fast speed (PF), imagery at a slow speed (IS), imagery at a fast
speed (IF) and control (C).
from the slow speed conditions. For the control group, a
signi® cant diþ erence was found between the preferred1
and slow speed conditions. For the slow practising
groups (PS and IS), no diþ erences between speed
conditions were apparent.
Discussion
The aim of Experiment 1 was to test the hypothesis that
interpolated practice in which participants imagined a
simple sequential motor action at a slow or a fast speed
would lead to changes of this sequential motor action
in a subsequent retention test. We also hypothesized
that interpolated imagery would result in interference
eþ ects similar to those of interpolated physical practice.
The results supported both hypotheses. The analysis
indicated an assimilation eþ ect, in that the participants
who imagined or physically performed the sequential
motor action during the retention interval at a slow
speed showed a reduction in speed during the retention
test (relative to the baseline test), whereas the parti-
cipants who imagined or physically performed the
sequential motor action at a fast speed showed an
increase in speed during the retention test. Both slow
practising groups were signi® cantly diþ erent from the
control group, with the imagery and physical practice
groups showing similar diþ erences, indicating a distinct
retroactive interference eþ ect and functional equiva-
lence of the two kinds of practice. However, for the fast
practising groups, the eþ ects were less pronounced. The
relatively small eþ ect for the fast imagery group com-
pared with the fast physical group might suggest that
imagining a motor action at a fast rate could be quite
diý cult (con® rmed by the verbal remarks of some of
the participants), at least more diý cult than imagining
it at a slow speed. In addition, the results indicated
that, for the fast practising groups, the eþ ects were pre-
dominantly found in the slow speed conditions, whereas
no such diþ erence between speed conditions was found
for the slow practising groups.
Although participants in the imagery groups reported
that they imagined the steps of the sequential motor
action, a direct check was not possible. Covertly verbal-
izing the steps of the sequential motor action (during
the retention interval) could have aþ ected the retention
test in the same way. For instance, it is well known that
many dancers covertly count the steps when performing
a dance. The same holds for some of the movements
performed during ¯ oor exercises in gymnastics and for
hurdle-racers in track-and-® eld events who count the
steps between the hurdles. Therefore, it is conceivable
that the participants in the imagery groups covertly
counted the steps of the sequential motor action, instead
of imaging them. If verbal rehearsal of the steps of a
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sequential motor action leads to a similar interference
eþ ect as imagery in practice, then the conclusions of
Experiment 1 are equivocal, and cannot be considered
consistent with Lang’ s bio-informational theory. This
issue was addressed in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to determine if the assimi-
lation tendency also occurs when participants verbally
rehearse the steps of the sequential motor action during
the retention interval. Because pronouncing words out
loud at high speed might be diý cult, all experimental
groups in Experiment 2 practised the interpolated trials
at a slow speed. If verbal rehearsal yields an assimilation
eþ ect, then verbal rehearsal of the steps of the sequential
motor action at a slow speed during a retention interval
should lead to a slower performance of these move-
ments during the retention test, relative to baseline
performance.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-four participants (9 males, 15 females) took
part in Experiment 2 (age 26.0 ± 4.67 years). All parti-
cipants were naive to the aim of the experiment, did not
participate in Experiment 1 and were paid for their
participation.
Apparatus and procedure
The apparatus used in Experiment 1 was also used in
Experiment 2. The Movement Imagery Questionnaire
was not used and participants were not asked questions
about their habitual use of imagery. The procedure
of Experiment 2 was similar to that of Experiment 1.
Participants were again tested individually, were given
standardized instructions, provided informed consent
and performed the same sequential motor action as in
Experiment 1.
The participants were randomly assigned to one of
three groups:
1. Imagine the sequential motor action at a slow speed
(imagery group, IS).
2. Imagine the sequential motor action at a slow
speed while pronouncing words out loud that
were compatible with the steps (combination group,
IVS).
3. Pronounce words out loud that were incompatible
with the steps of the sequential motor action at a slow
speed (verbal group, VS).
We assumed that pronouncing words out loud that were
incompatible with the steps would prevent imagery of
the sequential motor action. The baseline test and
retention test were identical for all participants in all
groups.
During the retention interval, the participants in the
imagery and combination groups were instructed to
imagine the movements as vividly as possible by using
all their senses (see `Procedure’  section of Experiment
1). The participants in the combination group were also
instructed to verbally rehearse the imagined movements
using a string of words compatible with the steps of the
sequential motor action (the IVS-string translates to:
f`orward, closing up, backward, closing up, sideways,
closing up, forward, closing up, backward, closing up,
sideways, closing up’ ; see Fig. 1). The participants in the
verbal group rehearsed the same set of one- or two-
syllable words but in a diþ erent order, incompatible
with the sequential motor action (the VS-string
translates to: `backward, sideways, forward, sideways,
closing up, sideways, backward, sideways, forward,
sideways, closing up, sideways’ ). As in Experiment 1,
all participants received ® ve blocks of ® ve successive
trials at the slow practice speed. Between each block,
the participants were allowed a short break of 1± 1.5
min. The dependent variables and data analysis were
identical to those used in Experiment 1.
Manipulation check. After completing the retention
test, a brief post-experimental interview was con-
ducted with all participants. The participants in the
imagery and combination groups were asked if they
had imagined the steps of the sequential motor action
and if they had imagined the motor action at the
instructed speed. The participants in the verbal group
were asked if they had used imagery during the
experiment.
Results
Eþ ect of speed conditions
To determine if the three groups were comparable at the
baseline test and if the speed conditions were performed
according to the instructions provided, a repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted on the mean time
(T) to perform a trial at baseline, with group (IS, IVS
and VS) as a between-individuals factor and speed
condition (slow, preferred1, preferred2 and fast) as a
within-individuals factor. This analysis only revealed
a signi® cant eþ ect for speed condition (F3,63 = 115.14,
P < 0.001, observed power = 1.00). No eþ ect was found
for group (F1,21 = 2.10, P = 0.147, observed power =
0.38) and there was no interaction.
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Retention interval
During the baseline test, the mean time to complete
one sequential motor action in the slow speed con-
dition (for all groups) was 139% of the mean preferred
speed; for the fast speed condition, it was 74%. During
the retention interval, the mean time to pronounce
the words of one trial (in the slow speed condition)
was 183% of the preferred speed for the participants
in the combined group and 128% for the participants
in the verbal group, indicating that they did pro-
nounce the words during the retention interval at a
slow speed, as instructed. The participants in the
imagery and combination groups reported that they
imagined the steps of the sequential motor action at
the slow speed. None of the participants in the verbal
group reported that they had used imagery during the
experiment.
Eþ ect of interference
To establish if verbal practice, like imagery, also
leads to an assimilation tendency, a repeated-measures
ANOVA was performed on the constant error (CE),
with group (IS, IVS and VS) as a between-individuals
factor and speed condition (slow, preferred1, preferred2
and fast) as a within-individuals factor. There were
signi® cant main eþ ects for group (F2,21 = 5.30, P =
0.014, observed power = 0.78) and for speed condition
(F3,63 = 3.04, P = 0.035, observed power = 0.69); there
was no signi® cant interaction. Post-hoc analysis (LSD
test, with a level of signi® cance of 0.05) on group
revealed a signi® cant diþ erence between the imagery
group (CEIS 459 ± 452 ms) and the other two groups
(CEIVS - 249 ± 668 ms; CEVS - 486 ± 661 ms). The
combination and visual groups did not diþ er from
one another, but both performed the sequential motor
action faster during the retention test than the imagery
group. These results provide further evidence for
the speed-speci® c interference of imagery observed in
Experiment 1. The second main eþ ect indicated signi® -
cant diþ erences between the four speed conditions.
However, because there was no interaction eþ ect
between group and speed condition, this main eþ ect is
of little relevance for the hypotheses tested.
Discussion
The aim of Experiment 2 was to determine if verbal
rehearsal of the steps of the sequential motor action
could have caused the retroactive interference eþ ects
found in Experiment 1. The results of Experiment 2
showed that verbally pronouncing a string of words at a
slow rhythm did not result in an assimilation tendency.
In addition, the means of the combination and verbal
groups were in the opposite direction to that of a
speed-speci ® c eþ ect. Imagery, on the other hand, again
resulted in a distinct assimilation eþ ect. Also, the eþ ect
of imagery was completely nulli® ed when the partici-
pants were instructed to imagine the sequential motor
action and to simultaneously pronounce words com-
patible with the imagined movement. Therefore, we
conclude that the speed-speci® c interference eþ ects in
Experiment 1 cannot be attributed to verbal rehearsal
of the steps.
General discussion
The experiments reported here investigated retroactive
interference eþ ects of imagined movement speed, as
well as the functional equivalence between imagery
and physical practice regarding movement speed.
Together, the results of the two experiments showed:
(1) that imagery of a speci® c movement speed inter-
feres with the recall of movement speed at retention;
(2) that the interference eþ ect biases recall in the
direction of the interpolated practice speed, thus
causing an assimilation eþ ect; (3) that when practising
the sequential motor action in slow motion, imagery and
physical practice yield similar retroactive interference,
suggesting functional equivalence, whereas for the fast
practice speed the eþ ect of imagery was slightly less
pronounced than the eþ ect of physical practice; and (4)
that vocalizing the rhythm of a sequential motor action
does not appear to cause a speed-speci® c retroactive
interference eþ ect.
Our results on retroactive interference of imagined
movement speed are consistent with the predictions of
Lang’ s (1977, 1979, 1984, 1987) bio-informational
theory. In line with Lang’ s theory, we hypothesized
that an assimilation tendency would be found for
movement speed in both directions (i.e. faster and
slower). The results of Experiments 1 and 2 combined
clearly support this predicted assimilation tendency
for imagined movement speed. Within an informational
network, speed might be encoded in three ways. First,
creating a mental image of a slow or fast performed
motor action will result in diþ erent response proposi-
tions. Secondly, movement speed might be encoded in
the preparatory set by means of its deduced meaning
or consequences. A movement performed or imagined
at diþ erent speeds will result in diþ erent meaning
propositions. Thirdly, performing a movement at
two speeds will reveal diþ erent optical ¯ ow patterns.
Visualizing these two ¯ ow patterns will result in two
distinct sets of stimulus propositions.
Previous retroactive interference studies have shown
that physical performance and imagery appear to be
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functionally equivalent to movement amplitude or
movement length (Johnson, 1982), movement pattern
(Gabriele et al., 1989; Hall et al., 1995) and the amount
of practice (Hall et al., 1995). We have shown that this
equivalence also largely holds for movement speed. This
functional equivalence between imagery and overt
motor performance is consistent with the similarity
between the patterns and areas of cerebral activation
observed during imagery of a motor action and during
execution of the genuine overt motor action (Decety
et al., 1994; Jeannerod and Decety, 1995; Cunnington
et al., 1996; Sirigu et al., 1996; Crammond, 1997).
The above-mentioned retroactive interference studies
and the present study revealed that the eþ ects of
imagery and physical practice were practically equiva-
lent. These results are surprising given that several
reviews (e.g. Feltz and Landers, 1983; Murphy and
Jowdy, 1992; Murphy, 1994) have concluded that
imagery is less eþ ective than physical practice in facili-
tating motor performance. Hall et al. (1992) discussed
three factors in¯ uencing the eþ ectiveness of imagery
(i.e. the nature of the task, the type of imagery instruc-
tions and the participants’  imagery ability). However,
none of these factors provides a satisfactory explanation
of the relatively strong eþ ects found for imagery in
interference studies. It appears that these studies have
something else in common: imagery was applied to
alter or convert the performance of a subsequent motor
task. The relatively few retroactive interference studies
appear to suggest that imagery is more eþ ective when
interfering with the performance of a subsequent motor
action than when it is applied to facilitate motor per-
formance. Janssen and Sheikh (1994) have indicated
that the detrimental eþ ect of negative images appears
to be greater than the eý cacy of positive images.
According to Lang’ s bio-informational theory, imagery
can modify the preparatory set to respond. When
imagery is applied to a motor action in the same way
as that action was or will be performed, the preparatory
set will not be modi® ed very much. On the other hand,
when a motor image is diþ erent from the learned action,
the preparatory set to respond is more likely to be
modi® ed.
The studies of Brooks (1968) and Williams et al.
(1969) could provide an explanation why the verbal
and combination groups in Experiment 2 did not show
speed-speci ® c interference. According to Williams et al.
(1969), activities that deal with kinaesthetic memory
show interference eþ ects on the recall accuracy of
movements and not on the recall of linguistic variables.
Brooks (1968) noted a distinction between imagery and
verbal processes by showing that pointing responses
interfered more with visual imagery, whereas verbal
responses interfered more with the verbal recall of
sentences. A task will produce the largest and most
speci® c interference on another task if both tasks
embrace the same modality and make use of the same
kind of memory. Contrary to most dual-coding theories
(e.g. Paivio, 1991; Annett, 1995), no additive eþ ect
was found of verbal rehearsal on imagery movement
speed. When imagery was combined with verbal
rehearsal, the constant error had an intermediate value.
Although the results of the verbal groups point to an
intriguing relation between movement imagery and
verbal rehearsal, this is beyond the scope of the present
study.
Johnson (1982), Gabriele et al. (1989) and Hall
et al. (1995) used relatively simple, somewhat arti® cial
motor tasks. The present study has shown that a more
natural and complex action (a sequential motor action)
can also exhibit interference eþ ects with speci® c assimi-
lation tendencies. It is likely, therefore, that retroactive
interference owing to imagery will appear in a variety of
practical settings and in everyday life. This is especially
interesting in the light of recommendations to use
motor imagery in slow motion: to enrich the content
of an image (Andre and Means, 1986) or to r`eplay’  a
previous performance to examine critical parts of it
(Perry and Morris, 1995). In addition, slow motion
imagery might be very useful in sports where partici-
pants tend to hurry during performance, such as golf.
During such motor tasks, which are known to be sensi-
tive to competition stress, the assimilation tendency
of slow motion imagery might reduce the hastiness.
However, the more common recommendation of sport
psychologists to use imagery in real time appears justi-
® ed. A sport psychologist implementing imagery or
an athlete applying imagery should be cautions about
the imagined scenes, because inappropriate images have
t`he potential of producing signi® cant decrements in
performance’  (Janssen and Sheikh, 1994, p. 17). To be
most eþ ective, the mental image should re¯ ect in every
respect, including the movement speed applied, the
desired performance of the motor action.
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